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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE OLSEN, 
Plaintiff and Responde.nt7 
PREFERRED RISK MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY~ An 
Iowa Corporation~ 
Defendant ani£ A.ppellanio 
Case N 1J>o 9179 
APPELLANT•s BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from the verdict and judgment of 
the Second Judicial District Court, arising out of an 
action based on the insurance contract between :respond~ 
l! 
1 ent and appellant as that contract relates to accidents in 
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Such an accident, involving respondent, occurred on 
April 5, 1958, on Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Utah. 
The court denied a motion for new trial and this appeal 
is taken from the ruling of the court on matters of law 
during the course of the trial and from the denial of said 
motion for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent and plaintiff in this case was insured on 
April 5, 1958, by defendant under automobile insuran~ 
policy No. 436-87 4. In addition to other provisions, the 
policy contained the following provision: 
"Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company, 
Des Moines, Iowa, agrees with the insured . . . : 
Cover.age U To pay all sums which the insured 
or his legal representative shall be legally entitled 
to recover as damages from the owner or operator 
of an uninsured automobile because of bodily in-
jury, sickness or disease, including death resulting 
therefrom, hereinafter called 'bodily injury,' sus-
tained by the insured, caused by accident and 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use 
of such uninsured automobile; provided, deter-
mination as to whether the insured or such repre-
sentative is legally entitled to recover such dam-
ages, and if so the amount thereof, shall be made 
by agreement between the insured or such repre-
sentative and the company or, if they fail to agree, 
by arbitration." 
That on the said date, plaintiff was driving her auto-
mobile in a southerly direction along vVashington Boule-
vard in Ogden, Utah. In the block between Twenty-Sixth 
and Twenty-Seventh Streets, she observed that she had a 
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flat tire. She drove toward the right hand or west side 
of the roadway and stopped her car with its rear end 
about forty-seven ( 47) feet north of the north curb of 
Twenty-Seventh Street and with its right side approxi-
mately four to seven (7) feet east from the west curb 
of Washington Boulevard. At this point, Washington 
Boulevard has two lanes for southbound traffic and there 
is an additional space between the outside or western 
lane and the curb which was unobstructed. 
She proceeded to the rear of her car, looked at the 
tire, and then observed a car which had pulled up behind 
her car, approximately four or five feet back of the rear 
end of her car, and which had honked. She went back 
to this car, which was driven by Clarence LeRoy Nuxoll, 
rapped on the window and Mr. Nuxoll rolled down the 
window. She spoke with him briefly and observed his 
condition, which she described as "looking like he'd been 
drinking" and that he looked drunk to her and did not 
seem to understand her. She then walked back to the rear 
of her car, standing between the rear bumper of her car 
and the front end of the Nuxoll car, opened the trunk 
lid and bent over to commence removing the tools from 
the trunk. The Nuxoll car moved forward and plaintiff 
was injured by being caught between the bumpers of 
the two vehicles. 
At the trial of this case, and after the conclusion 
of the evidence of both parties, counsel for the plaintiff 
argued to the jury. Included in his argument were the 
writing of figures upon a blackboard placed before the 
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jury and the mathematical computation of plaintiff's 
general damages based on various mat~ematical calcu-
lations'" Reproduced. hereafter is a ·copy of the figures 
written upon the blackboard on the, basis of which the 
computation or suggested computation was to be made. 
Counsel for defendant had previously requested the re- · 
,porter to report the arguments of counsel and the tran-
scription of proceedings contains from Page 122 to Page 
130 the verbatim opening argument of counsel for plain~ 
tiff. 
The blackboard appeared as below at the conclusion 









~,360.00 " Yea~ 
5475.00 
Figures in brackets are defendant's. Remainder is 
plaintiff's. 
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Counsel for plaintiff also referred specifically in this 
argument to what each juror himself would take for 
experiencing the injuries, pain and disability claimed by 
plaintiff and these items are also contained in the record 
in counsel for plaintiff's opening argument. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING PLAINTIFF FREE 
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW AND IN FAILING TO SUBMIT THIS QUESTION OF 
FACT TO THE JURY FOR DETERMINATION. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANT AND RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE BASIS OF THE PREJUDICIAL AND IM-
PROPER ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF IN 
SUGGESTING A MATHEMATI·CAL COMPUTATION OR 
CALCULATION OF GENERAL DAMAGES. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RESTRAIN 
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF FROM CONTINUING WITH 
THE LINE OF ARGUMENT DIRECTED TO WHAT EACH 
JUROR INDIVIDUALLY WOULD TAKE FOR INJURIES, 
PAIN AND SUFFERING, AND DISABILITY OF THE KIND 
AND DEGREE ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF AND IN FAILING 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THIS POINT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING PLAINTIFF FREE 
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW AND IN FAILING TO SUBMIT THIS QUESTION OF 
FACT TO THE JURY FOR DETERMINATION. 
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Plaintiff had parked her car at a point where it was 
still upon that part of Washington Boulevard normally 
used by traffic (R. 61, 62). The right side of her car was 
between three and seven feet from the curb (R. 10, 59)o 
She was still able to drive the car and in fact had driven 
about one-half block from the point where she first 
noticed the flat tire. The space between her car and the 
curb was level, clear and unobstructed (R. 31, 61). 
She alighted from her car after stopping it, looked 
at her tire, talked to another motorist, and then observed 
the car driven by Clarence LeRoy Nuxoll stopped about 
five feet from the rear of her car, headed the same way 
(R. 10, 11, 32). She walked back to the Nuxoll car, rapped 
on the window and told him she had a flat tire (R.12, 31). 
She then walked to her trunk and opened it to see 
about her spare tire, thus placing herself between the 
two cars (R.12, 33). She did not observe any danger, nor 
was she aware of the movement of the Nuxoll car until 
she was struck, although its lights were on and its motor 
running (R. 32, 33). She was not watching or paying 
any particular attention to the Nuxoll car, although she 
was aware that Nuxoll was not in a normal condition, 
that he did not appear to understand her, and he looked 
drunk (R. 31, 32). 
It is a well-established rule that in considering the 
question of contributory negligence on the part of plain-
tiff, the court must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to defendant. If, when viewed in this light, the 
evidence gives rise to a legitimate question of fact, then 
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this issue must be submitted to the jury for determina-
tion. This court has consistently held to this rule. A 
typical Utah case in point is Finlayson v. Brady, 121 
Utah 204, 240 P. 2d 491. 
Defendant contends that the knowledge on the part 
of plaintiff of the intoxicated condition of Nuxoll placed 
upon plaintiff a greater duty of care for her own safety. 
A statement of the law on this point is found at 65 Corpus 
Juris Secundum Negl. Sec. 12, 399, 400. 
"Intoxication of a person does not relieve 
others of the obligation to exercise care to avoid 
injuring him, but may, on the contrary, impos~ 
a duty of exercising greater care than would 
otherwise be sufficient, where his appearance and 
actions indicate such a degree of intoxication as 
affects his capacity to care for his own safety." 
It is axiomatic that a person must exercise reason-
able care for his own safety, and that failure to do so is 
negligence. Negligence is the failure to do what a reason-
able and prudent person would have done under the cir-
cumstances, or doing what such a person would not have 
done under such circumstances. (Berger v. Salt Lake 
City, 56 Utah 403, 191 P. 233; White v. Pinney, 99 Utah 
484, 108 P. 2d 249.) It is the duty of all motorists to use 
reasonable care to keep a lookout for other vehicles and 
other conditions reasonably to be anticipated (W eenig 
Bros. v. Manning, 1 Utah 2d 101, 262 P. 2d 491). 
Defendant contends that the jury could reasonably 
have found from the facts that plaintiff was guilty of 
negligence which proximately contributed to the happen-
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ing of the accident under the foregoing rules and under 
the instructions requested by defendant on the issue of 
negligence. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANT AND RESPONDENT'S MOTIO~ FOR A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE BASIS OF THE PREJUDICIAL AND IM-
PROPER ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF IN 
SUGGESTING A MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATION OR 
CALCULATION OF GENERAL DAMAGES. 
Defendant's contention that the court should have 
granted a new trial· is based on the argument of counsfll 
for plaintiff made to the jury in which counsel wrote 
figures on the blackboard (R. 128, 129) (See diagram of 
blackboard in Statement of Facts), which suggested the 
mathematical computation or calculation by the jury of 
the general damage verdict for plaintiff. The diagram 
of the blackboard reproduced in the Statement of Facts 
is an exact copy of an exhibit submitted to the trial court 
with defendant's Motion for New Trial, such exhibit be-
ing initialled by counsel for ·both parties and being agreed 
to accurately portray the figures placed upon the black-
board. 
The figures on the upper portion of the diagram 
were placed on the blackboard in the course of and as a 
part of the first argument of counsel for plaintiff, made 
to the jury prior to the submission of this case to the 
jury. Counsel for defendant objected to this line of argu-
ment (R.128) and reserved an exception on the basis that 
it constituted error. This question has not been consider-
10 
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ed by the Utah Supreme Court prior to this appeal. There 
have, however, been several cases in other jurisdictions 
on the question of a suggested method for computing 
general damages other than that sanctioned by the court 
in its instructions and given by counsel as a part of the 
closing argument. 
The great weight of authority, as well as the better 
view, holds that such argument is prejudicial, constitutes 
error and is grounds for reversal on appeal. The leading 
case, and one which is cited with approval in many juris-
dictions is that of Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 
713 (1958) decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
Since this case is directly in point and is typical of the 
holdings of the other jurisdictions which concur in the 
law and in the result, we submit herewith a brief of that 
case. 
Facts: 
Plaintiff, Nancy Botta, was a passenger in an 
automobile driven by defendant, Herman Brunner, 
when it collided with an automobile driven by co-
defendant, Leo Frieband. Plaintiff sued both the 
drivers to recover damages for injuries and mone-
tary losses suffered. Rose DeSantis, another 
passenger in Brunner's automobile also sued both 
drivers. The actions were tried together. The 
jury returned verdicts of $5,500.00 in favor of 
Mrs. Botta and $300.00 in favor of Mrs. DeSantis 
against Brunner. Frieband was exonerated. 
Both plaintiffs sought a new trial alleging inade-
quacy of awards and other errors of the court. 
Upon denial of the motions, Mrs. Botta appealed, 
attacking the legal propriety of the order against 
11 
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her as well as the entire judgment. The Appellate 
Division concluded that error had been committed 
in the charge to the jury as to the nature of the 
burden imposed on the plaintiff with respect to 
proof of her injuries and ordered a new trial 
against the defendant Brunner, but limited it to 
the sole issues of damages. The Trial Court re-
fused to permit the counsel for the plaintiff to 
suggest to the jury in his summation a mathe-
matical formula for admeasurement of damages 
for pain and suffering. The plaintiff urged that 
this was error. The Appellate Division agreed. 
Question: 
Whether or not it is error on the part of the Trial 
Court to refuse the counsel permission to suggest 
to the jury in his summation a mathematical 





Counsel for plaintiff or defendant may not state 
to the jury in the opening or closing, his belief 
as to pecuniary value or price of pain and suffer-
ing per hour or day or week, and ask that such 
figure be used as part of the mathematical formu-
la for calculating damages to be awarded, since 
such suggestions by counsel constitute an un-
warranted intrusion into the domain of the jury 
and impart into the trial elements of sheer specu-
lation on a matter, which by universal understand-
ing, is not susceptible of evaluation on any such 
basis. 
Rationale: 
Rationale for the court was by Francis, Justice 
for the court. 
12 
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For hundreds of years the measure of damages 
for pain and suffering following the wake of a 
personal injury has been "fair and reasonable 
compensation." This general standard was adopt-
ed because of universal acknowledgement that a: 
more specific or definitive one is impossible. 
There is and there can be no fixed basis, table, 
standard, or mathematical rule which will serve 
as an accurate index and guide to the establish-
ment of damage awards for personal injuries, and 
there is no measure by which the amount of pain 
and suffering endured by a particular human can 
be calculated. 
The varieties and degrees of pain are almost in-
finite. Individuals differ greatly in susceptibility 
to pain and in capacity to withstand it, and the 
impossibility of recognizing or of isolating fixed 
levels or plateaus of suffering must be conceded. 
The standard for measuring damages for personal 
injuries is reasonable compensation and the ad-
ministration of this criterion is entrusted to the 
impartial conscience and judgment of jurors who 
may be expected to act reasonably, intelligently 
and in harmony with the evidence .. 
There can be no doubt that the prime purpose of 
suggestions, direct or indirect, in the opening or 
closing statements of counsel of a per hour or per 
diem sums as the value of or as compensation for 
pain, suffering and kindred elements associated 
with injury and disability is to instill in the minds 
of the jurors impressions, figures and amounts 
not founded or appearing in the evidence. 
If the plaintiff's counsel is permitted to make such 
valuation suggestions to the jury, justice cannot 
be administered fairly in the trial of this type 
of case. Can defense counsel argue that pain and 
13 
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suffering are worth a lesser amount 7 If he at-
tempts to do so, he must necessarily inject as fur-
ther factual suggestions valuations which again 
are incapable of proof. By doing so, he fortifies 
his adversary's implication that the law recog-
nizes pain and suffering as having been evaluated 
and as capable of being evaluated on such basis. 
Suggestions of the sort we are asked to approve 
here constitute an unwarranted intrusion into the 
domain of the jury. 
Text authorities supporting defendant's position and 
the position of the. court in Botta v. Brunner, supra, are 
as follows: 
"The jury is allowed to find the value of pain 
and suffering upon their own knowledge, since no 
evidence of the value of pain and suffering can be 
given." Sedgwick, Damages, 9th Ed., 1912, Sec. 
171a. 
"The court should make it clear to the jury 
that an award of damages for pain and suffering 
must be limited to compensation alone. ***"'" 
"Instructions should not put a price or money 
value on pain and suffering." 15 Am. Jur., Dam-
ages, Sec. 37 4. 
"There is no standard by which physical pain 
and suffering may be measured and compensated 
for in money. It can only be said that an award 
of damages therefor should be estimated in a fair 
and reasonable manner, and not by any sentiment-
al or fanciful standard, and should constitute a 
reasonable compensation to plaintiff on the facts 
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Many recent cases from other jurisdictions have 
reached the same result. In the case of Certified TV and 
Appliance Company, Inc. Vo Harrington, Sup. Cto of 
Appeals of Va., 109 S.E. 2d, 126 (1959), the court said~ 
"The use by plaintiff's counsel of a mathe-
matical formula for measuring pain, suffering, 
mental anguish and percentage of disability on a 
per diem basis involve speculation of counsel un-
supported by the evidence, and the setting forth 
of his calculations on a blackboard amounted to 
the giving of testimony in his summation argu-
ment and constituted error." 
The Delaware Supreme Court in the case of Henne 
et al v. Balick 146 A.2d, 394 ( 1958) held: 
"The use by counsel for plaintiff of a mathe-
matical formula setting forth the claim of pain 
and suffering on a per diem basis was merely a 
speculation of counsel for plaintiff unsupported 
by the evidence and was for that reason im-
proper." 
The Supreme Court of the state of Massachusetts 
also dealt with this problem in the case of Gardner Vo 
State Taxi, Inc., et al, 336 Mass. 28, 142 N.E. 2d 586 
(1957) in which case the court said: 
"Where plaintiff's counsel in his argument to 
the jury improperly asked the jury to award plain-
tiff $200.00 per week for total disability and multi-
ply it by six months and award plaintiff $100.00 
per week for four weeks for partial disability, 
when there was nothing in the evidence that would 
justify a finding of a total disability of six months 
or partial disability of one month, and the matter 
15 
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was seasonably brought to the attention of the 
trial judge by defendant's counsel, but the trial 
judge neither stopped plaintiff's counsel at the 
moment of the offense, nor dealt with the subject 
later in his charge, and the jury returned a verdict 
against each defendant in an amount which coin-
cided exactly with that asked for by plaintiff's 
counsel, the error in the statement of the plain .. 
tiff's counsel to the jury was prejudicial." 
A good statement of the law is found in Braddock 
v. Seaboard Airline RR Company, Sup. Ct. of Fla. 80 
Southern 2d 662 (1955), in which the Florida Supreme 
Court made the following statement~ 
"The rule for measuring damages for pain 
and suffering, past, present and future, is that 
there is no standard by which to measure it except 
the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors. 
Their problem is not one of mathematical calcu-
lation but involves the exercise of their sound 
judgment of what is fair and right." 
Other cases in accord include: 
Warren Petroleum Corp. et al v. Pyeatt, 275 S.W. 
2d 216 (1955) (Texas); Louisville and N.R. Co. et al v. 
Prean, 174 S.E. 209 (1934) (Georgia); Wersbe v. Broad-
way and S.A.R. Co., 2 N.Y.S. 637 (1893) (New York); 
and Krantz v. Nichols, App. Ct. of ill., 11 ill. App. 2d 
31, 135 N.E. 2d 816 (1956). 
A similar rule has been adopted by the Federal Court 
in the case of Wuth v. United States, U.S. Dist. Ct., 161 
Fed. Supp. 661 (E.D. Va., 1958): 
16 
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"Fixing a per diem valuation for past and 
future physical pain and mental anguish is not a 
proper method of computing a imal award. 
"Pain, suffering and mental anguish, past and 
future, life expectancy, loss of wages, past and 
future, and inconvenience and embarrassment are 
factors which must be carefully weighed in arriv-
ing at a final award." 
It is recognized that there is a division of authority 
on this point; however, both the great numerical weight 
as well as the better law, modern viewpoint, and better 
reasoning, are in favor of the proposition advanced by 
defendant in this ease. Following are listed additional 
citations designated as being in agreement with or 
against the position argued by defendant in this case and 
the court's attention is directed to the fact that only five 
jurisdictions in the United States, four of which are geo-
graphically located close together and all in the deep 
South, have adopted a view that argument of the type 
used by plaintiff's counsel in this case is acceptable. 
Additional eases concurring: 
Goodhart v. Penn. Railroad Co., 177 Pa.1, 35 A. 191 
(1896); Bostwick v. Pittsburgh Railroad Co., 255 Pa. 387, 
100 A. 123 (1917); Hub v. Hallowell, 304 Pa. 128, 154 A. 
582 (1931); Vaughn v. Magee, 218 Fed. 630 (3rd Civ., 
1914); Stassum v. Chapin, 324 Pa. 125, 188 A. ill (1936). 
Cases against: 
Kendlee v. Edwards, 126 Ind. App. 261, 130 N .E. 2d 
491 (App. Ct.1955); Four-County Electric Power Ass'n. 
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v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (Sup. Ct., 1954) ;, 
J. D. Wright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler, 231 S.W. 2d 
786 (Tex. Civ.) App.1950); Texas Employers' Insurance 
Ass'n v. Cruz, 280 S.W. 2d 388 (Tex. ·Civ. App. 1955); 
Kimb~ll v. Noel, 228 S.W. 2d 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); 
Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 298 Ky. 706, 183 S.W. 2d 637 
(Sup. Ct. 1944) ; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Brian's 
Adm'r, 224 Ky. 419, 6 S.W. 2d 491 (Ct. App. 1928); Dean 
v. Wabash R. Co., 229 Mo. 425, 129 S.W. 953 (Sup. Ct. 
1910). 
Respondent therefore contends, on the basis of the 
record and the authorities on this point, that defendant's 
position was prejudiced by the improper argument of 
counsel for plaintiff, that this improper argument constiQ 
tuted error of such magnitude as to be grounds for reverQ 
sal, and that the trial court erred in failing to grant de-
fendant's Motion for New Trial. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RESTRAIN 
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF FROM CONTINUING WITH 
THE LINE OF ARGUMENT DIRECTED TO WHAT EACH 
JUROR INDIVIDUALLY WOULD TAKE FOR INJURIES~ 
PAIN AND SUFFERING AND DISABILITY OF THE KIND 
AND DEGREE ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF AND IN FAILING 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THIS POINT. 
The authorities seem to be generally in accord that 
it is error to apply what has been referred to as the 
"golden rule" of damages in determining award of gen-
eral damages as was done in the instant case. The weight 
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of authorities on this point holds that jurors are not to 
fix what they themselves would want as compensation 
if they had sustained the injuries or what the pain and 
suffering would be worth to them. Such determination 
must be made under the instructions given by the court 
and on the basis of each juror computing as best he can 
what is fair compensation to the plaintiff for such injur-
ies and pain and suffering. 
It is a well-recognized fact that different persons 
have different thresholds of pain and different levels of 
sensitivity to injury. Also, that a certain disability will 
have a different value when considered with respect to-
a person who relies for his livelihood on physical prowess 
than the same disability would have as related to a person 
who was only slightly dependent upon his physical prow-
ess in the conduct of his everyday affairs. 
Appellant respectfully directs the court's attention 
to the following authorities in support on this position: 
Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A. (2d) 713; Good-
rich v. Thomas Cort, 80 N.J.L. 653, 657, 77 A. 1049 (Sup. 
Ct. 1910); Stein v. Meyer, 150 F. Supp. 365 (D.C.E.D. Pa. 
1957); Ravel v. Couravallos, 245 S.W. 2d 731 (Tex. Civ~ 
App. 1952); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Carson, 63 S.Wo 
2d 1096 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)a 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant believes that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error on each of the three points urged in 
this brief, particularly that the issue of plaintiff's contri-
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butory negligence should have been submitted to the 
jury for determination; that the court should have grantQ 
ed a new trial on defendant's motion, based upon preju-
dice to defendant, resulting from argument of counsel 
for plaintiff, suggesting a mathematical computation 
or calculation of general damages; and for the court's 
failure to restrain counsel for plaintiff from arguing to 
the jury that damages should be assessed for plaintiff 
on the basis of what each juror individually would take 
for such injuries, pain and suffering and disability and 
the court's failure to instruct the jury on this point. 
Each of the assigned errors individually resulted in 
such prejudice that the jury could not fairly and impar-
tially determine the issues in this case and that, there-
fore, the judgment of the lower court should be reversed 
and the case remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
Attorney for Defendant. 
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